Feminist Alternatives to Traditional Argumentation by Al-Tamimi, Khameiel
University of Windsor
Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 8
Jun 3rd, 9:00 AM - Jun 6th, 5:00 PM
Feminist Alternatives to Traditional Argumentation
Khameiel Al-Tamimi
University of Windsor
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been
accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please
contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.
Al-Tamimi, Khameiel, "Feminist Alternatives to Traditional Argumentation" (2009). OSSA Conference Archive. 5.
http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA8/papersandcommentaries/5
 
Al-Tamimi, K. (2009). Feminist Alternatives to Traditional Argumentation. In: J. Ritola (Ed.), 
Argument Cultures: Proceedings of OSSA 09, CD-ROM (pp. 1-8), Windsor, ON: OSSA. 
Copyright © 2009, the author. 
 
Feminist Alternatives to Traditional Argumentation 
 
KHAMEIEL AL-TAMIMI 
 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Windsor 
401 Sunset Avenue 
Windsor, ON, N9B 3P4 
Canada  
aln@uwindsor.ca 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: In this paper, I will look at the critiques that feminists have proposed to existing styles of 
argumentation. There are two prominent lines of feminist criticism of argumentation: the epistemic critique 
which argues that women were socialized to argue differently and the equity critique which asserts that 
argumentation is a patriarchal attempt to dominate one another, as such it is adversarial in nature. I will 
then discuss the alternatives feminists have proposed to traditional argumentation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper, I will look at the critiques that feminists have posed to existing styles of 
argumentation, in particular the traditional mode of argumentation which is often rooted 
in adversariality and hostility. However it must be made clear from the onset that there 
are two prominent lines of feminist criticism of argumentation. The cognitive and 
epistemic critique argues that females are socialized to think and interact differently and 
it is concerned with whether one sex is socialized to be more comfortable arguing. The 
other critique is the equity critique which argues that argumentation is an unjust, 
patriarchal attempt to dominate one another and as such it deals with the morality of 
arguing itself (Fulkerson 1996, p. 3). I will then discuss the alternatives that feminists 
have proposed to traditional argumentation. I would like to argue that the notion of 
narrative argument and argument as a cooperation will help ease the tension and 
adversariality found in traditional argument, precisely in the notion that argument is war. 
 
2. FEMINIST CRITICISM OF ARGUMENTATION 
 
Phyllis Rooney (2003) addresses the two main feminist critiques, (namely the cognitive 
and the equity critique) in her article entitled “Feminism and Argumentation: A response 
to Govier.” Rooney explains that feminists’ concern with argument has involved two 
main issues. The first issue is related to the question of whether there exist gender 
differences in reasoning and arguing. However, many have argued that even if such a 
difference does exist, it is due to gender stereotyping and social regulation, i.e. 
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socialization. Further, this first feminist concern is also related to the question of whether 
the traditional conception of argument has favoured a masculine mode and style of 
arguing. Rooney disagrees with Trudy Govier who argues that there is nothing in the 
practice of argument that excludes the feminine style of arguing, of paying attention to 
contextual details. Rooney on the other hand thinks that the kind of identification and 
analysis of argument encouraged within informal logic does indeed require formalism 
and rigidity, thus ignoring feminine styles of arguments.  
This concern of whether women argue or reason differently has led Michael A. 
Gilbert to look at the dominant mode of reasoning that people commonly use. In his book 
Coalescent Argumentation, Gilbert (1997) argues that there is a dominant and an official 
way to reason which abides according to the traditional “critical logical” reasoning 
process, also known as: C-L mode of reasoning (p. 50). According to the C-L mode of 
reasoning, emotional reactions are excluded from business decisions. Facts are what 
matter, while feelings and intuitions are discredited. And as such, the C-L model of 
reasoning is dominant while others are subordinate to it (p. 51). Gilbert’s point is that 
there is nothing morally wrong with limiting the applicability of certain modes of 
reasoning. In the United States, religious visions are excluded from a court of law while 
in Iran religious insights, as evidence, play an important role in the courts (p. 51). At the 
end, the acceptance of one mode of reasoning or proof as being better is a cultural, 
political, and a moral choice, and every society will have a dominant form. But the point 
is to recognize that there exists a dominant mode of reasoning which may advantage one 
group at the expense of excluding another. For example, excluding emotion from the 
arena of argumentation puts women at a disadvantage because women tend to appeal to 
emotion in their arguments. Gilbert disagrees with the major premise and goal of 
contemporary reasoning skills which states that one should argue, defend and justify their 
claim without any recourse to situational, contextual or personal information (p. 40). 
Gilbert writes that arguments are connected to their surrounding in a very complex way, 
for there are aspects of language, usage and style that make it hard for anyone to 
comprehend an argument based on its mere structure of premise and conclusion, if they 
are not familiar with the particular history of the arguers involved. This means that to 
fully understand an argument, one needs to look more in depth into context and the 
situation from which an argument springs forth, which may very well include emotion. 
Gilbert argues that the categories of evaluating arguments must extend to include “errors, 
forms, and categories that go beyond the logico-rational and include, systematically, all 
the modalities of human communication” (p. 41). Hence, Gilbert contends that 
philosophers should not exclude emotive reasoning, physical actions and intuitional 
communication from argumentation. 
The second concern that Rooney addresses in her article is the equity critique 
which deals with how adversariality is embedded in argumentation. This critique focuses 
on the surrounding context and the practice of argument, which is often infused with 
aggression and hostility that puts women at a disadvantage, since many women use 
politer forms of argumentation. A critique of argument as war is addressed by Janice 
Moulton (1983) in her article “A Paradigm of Philosophy: The Adversary Method,” 
where she argues that traditional argumentative styles are rooted in the “adversary 
method” which accepts aggressive behaviour as a model of philosophical reasoning. 
Moulton critiques this adversary method because according to this philosophical 
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methodology, aggression takes on positive connotations when it is connected to males or 
professional workers. Aggression is then connected to more positive concepts such as 
power, authority, competence and etc. The conflation of aggression with positive 
concepts has made it hard to see that polite and non-abrupt speech can be just as effective 
and persuasive (p. 150). Moulton finds a problem with this adversarial method asserting 
that argumentation and arguing take on a coercive disposition, in which to persuade and 
to argue is to find counterexamples. Under this paradigm, arguers find themselves 
disagreeing with everything, rather than agreeing on common assumptions and working 
from there (p. 154). This paradigm allows for the development of rude and hostile styles 
of argumentation where the focus of an argument is on winning rather than encouraging 
the development of good ideas. This adversarial method has led philosophers to ignore 
ways in which one may argue without being hostile. As such, arguments that are passive 
and indirect are not considered arguments due to the dominance of the adversarial 
method.  
Rooney again cites Govier who also responds to the critique launched against the 
adversariality of argument, by arguing that arguments are not necessarily confrontational 
and that either way, adversariality can be kept to a polite minimum (Rooney 2003, p. 4). 
Govier claims that minimal adversariality is an inevitable part of argument, but it is not 
entirely negative. Rooney however, disagrees that minimal adversariality is harmless 
because she thinks that even minimal adversariality is quite problematic. Whereas, 
Govier thinks that it is fine to have minimum adversariality because as long as difference 
of belief exists then so will adversariality. For instance, when I have a belief for X, 
someone else may have a belief for not-X, and so when we argue, we normally perceive 
difference of belief in terms of an argument against something as opposed to with 
something or someone. And this is precisely what Rooney finds very problematic because 
we are using hostile wording to describe, what are in fact, calm and neutral situations of 
arguing. Rooney points out that such minimal adversariality is still misdescribing the 
argument situation. Yet such adversariality is so much part of our descriptions that we 
hardly recognize it. As such, Rooney proposes that despite differences in belief, the 
argument situation should not be looked at this way (as arguing against), and arguers 
should be viewed as conversing with one another. As an alternative to saying I am 
arguing against not-x, Rooney puts forward:  
 
Could I not just as easily, and perhaps more accurately, say that I am arguing with not-X and with 
your argument for not-X, in that I am taking into consideration and reasoning with your premises 
and reasoning for not-X—even if at the end of the exchange I still hold X?” (2003, p. 4)  
 
The idea here that Rooney is proposing is argument as cooperative which would help to 
take the adversariality out of argument practices and also aid in including a more 
feminine style of arguing. Rooney thinks that argumentation tends to be conceived as 
arguing against instead of a notion of arguers as debating with one another, which she 
thinks is a more neutral and inclusive account of argumentation. This notion of “arguing 
with,” as advocated by Rooney, leaves room for an account of arguments as a 
collaborative attempt between arguers, as will be shown  later in the paper. Following this 
line of thought, I would like to develop the notion of argumentation as cooperative and 
see how narrative argument figures into this account. 
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3. ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTATION 
 
The essential difference between traditional argument and narrative argument is that 
narrative arguments are not adversarial in nature because they tend to be a cooperative 
attempt between arguers to understand each others’ positions. Many feminists conceive 
of traditional arguments as arguments that are rooted in the adversary method. As such, 
one way that feminist insights can contribute to argumentation and ridding it from 
adversariality is by looking at how women use different forms of argumentation and how 
they are silenced by traditional modes of argumentation. Further, Rooney is correct to 
point out  
 
that a feminist work (work that keeps gender issues right there as an important focus in the 
discussion) can provide understanding of argument and context that are not available without such 
a focus (2003, p. 3).  
 
Feminists, then, are more suited to talk about narrative arguments because women tend to 
use narrative as a form of argument. And that is precisely why feminists have reacted 
against the traditional mode by proposing other alternatives. Feminists see argument as a 
tool to advance knowledge and to resolve an issue. And because they see argument this 
way, the mode which has been traditionally put forth has been counterproductive to this 
aim. The traditional mode of argumentation of course claims that argumentation does 
serve as a tool for resolving issues but their means (arguments as war) is 
counterproductive to the goal they propose; whereas the approach taken by feminists 
actually achieves what the traditional school of argumentation seeks to achieve through 
argumentation, i.e. the advancement of knowledge.  
In “Positioning Oneself: A Feminist Approach to Argument,” Pamela J. Annas  
(1996) points to the complexity and difficulty of speaking about one feminist approach to 
argument, for she explains that there is no agreement among feminists on how to go 
about making changes in the teaching of argument. At one end, liberal feminists 
emphasize the similarity between men and women, and argue that women should write 
like men. Annas cites Margaret Pigott’s article “Sexist Roadblocks in Inventing, Focusing 
and Writing,” which identifies perceived inadequacies in women’s writing and argues 
that since there is more strengths in men’s writing, women should learn to master the 
traditional argument embodied by men as the masculine mode of arguing. Annas 
concedes, echoing the authors of Women’s Ways of Knowing that many women are not at 
ease with the traditional style of argumentation which is impersonal and combative, even 
those women that are confident in their own voice (1996, p. 129). Feminist critiques of 
argument  points to the need for changing the way we perceive and teach argument, and 
also to making room in the academy for an approach to argumentation that takes account 
of women’s ways of knowing (1996, p. 130).  
Kathleen M. Hunzer (1999) in her article, “Increasing the Visibility of the 
Disinclined and the Silenced: Enabling Alternatives to Traditional Argument,” discusses 
the alternatives that feminists propose to the traditional argument. Hunzer further 
elaborates that in the traditional conception of argument, to argue is essentially to attack 
and destroy your opponent. Feminists have reacted to the silencing effect of the adversary 
method on women, by proposing an alternative style that is different than the patriarchal 
and combative style of traditional arguments. Feminists reacted against the traditional 
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modes of argumentation by introducing other forms of argumentation such as narrative, 
which is not commonly recognized or perceived as an argument by the traditional mode 
of argumentation. The first alternative is discussed by Elizabeth Flynn and Judith 
Summerfield, which examines using personal narrative as a style of argument. Flynn and 
Summerfield argue that this narrative argument gives voice and confidence to the 
silenced students in class (Hunzer, p. 3). This technique of using personal narrative gives 
the power of voice to women who previously lacked it. Hunzer, elaborates on Judith 
Summerfield’s article entitled, “Principles for Propagation: On Narrative and Argument,” 
who argues that “storytellers across cultures have woven their ‘point of view, biases, and 
convictions [... and] causes’ into their stories, thus showing how the ‘tales, inescapably, 
carry principles that they can be threaded imperceptibly into character, plot, [or] setting’” 
(1999, p. 4). Summerfield shows that traditionally we conceive of narrative and argument 
as two separate poles, but she argues against such a separation; she claims that this is not 
how we carry ourselves in argumentation. On the contrary, Summerfield argues that there 
is no simple mode or utterance, because every move, gesture or utterance is set in a 
complicated “mess of motive, argument, persuasion, hope, commentary, desire, need, and 
invitation to be negotiated with” (Hunzer 1999, p. 4).  
Further, L.B Cebik (1971) has argued in his article “Narratives and Arguments,” 
that narratives structurally do not argue. The idea that narrative lacks organization in 
structure by its very nature shows that it will be difficult to make narratives fit into the 
strict structure of traditional argumentation as consisting of a premise and conclusion (p. 
13). Therefore, narrative arguments are not as direct as traditional arguments, but 
nevertheless narratives defend a position, which may not be articulated or written in a 
direct manner of premise and conclusion. Cebik states, “In stories, the narrative flows; no 
assertion stands out as an isolated fact” (p. 9). Cebik contends that narratives defend 
positions through artistic means. He further points out that narrative can function as an 
argument due to the ability of the one who has read the narrative to draw a position or 
argument out of it. Because in narratives, arguments are not direct so they do not jump 
out at you in the way traditional arguments do. As Cebik points  
 
argumentation may arise wholly from the constructive abilities of one who reads the narrative. In 
order for one to claim that a narrative contains, holds, or yields the argument, it is a necessary 
condition that there be a series of statements asserted or presupposed by both the narrative and 
argument which are narratively consistent with the narrative and argumentatively consistent with 
the argument. (1971, p. 21)  
 
Recognizing narrative arguments requires flexibility and open-mindedness as well as the 
ability to contextualize. Summerfield, as noted by Hunzer, argues that acknowledging 
narratives as arguments requires further recognition that narrative arguments are 
pervasive, complex and are various in kind. Summerfield thinks that using narration 
allows more room for contextualizing in arguments.  
The second alternative that has been developed by those dissatisfied with the 
traditional argumentative strategies involves seeing argument as coalescence and 
cooperation. This alternative, I would argue, fits well with the narrative argument 
approach. Because narrative arguments by nature require a notion of arguing as 
cooperation, i.e. we cooperate to tell stories and understand others’ stories. As noted 
above, this approach has been argued by Michael A. Gilbert, in his book Coalescent 
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Argumentation. In his book, Gilbert argues that coalescent argumentation is a normative 
ideal, which involves the joining together of two distinct claims via recognition and 
exploration of opposing positions. As Gilbert states, “The coalescent approach can be 
expressed in the very simplest of terms. First, by exposing the positions of the dispute 
partners, second, by finding the points of commonality, and finally by beginning from 
those points, attempt to explore means of maximizing the satisfaction of goals that are 
apparently in conflict” (p. 119). This coalescent approach tries to find commonality so 
that agreement in beliefs can be reached more easily and disagreement and hostility is 
reduced to a minimum. However, a detailed analysis of this approach is beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
 Further, Hunzer cites Catherine E. Lamb who also proposes a cooperative 
process to argumentation which increases the visibility of the silenced by promoting 
discussion rather than adversariality (p. 5). As Hunzer notes, Lamb refers to this process 
as mediation and negotiation, because it creates an atmosphere in which arguers can 
negotiate their ideas and search for the truth together. Hunzer explains this approach 
while drawing on Lamb that  
 
The students are assigned the roles of either ‘disputant’ or ’mediator.’ ’If they are one of the 
disputants, they write a memo to the mediator in which they explain the problem as they see it, 
including an attempt to separate the immediate ways in which the problem has exhibited itself 
from the underlying issues or interests.’ ‘If a student is the mediator, he or she writes a memo to a 
supervisor, summarizing the issues for both parties as they appear at that point’ (20) These memos, 
in turn, are ‘part of  what will give the mediator a sense of the dimensions of the conflict.’ The 
second writing is the ’mediation agreement’ that is prepared by all of the students in the group, 
which enables the mediator and the disputant to ‘move beyond the conflict that divides them’ (20-
21). (p. 8) 
 
Both arguers can think honestly and critically about their positions. Lamb used this 
method in her college writing class, and she discovered that this method allowed students 
to adopt both positions in any given issue. The students are given a fuller understanding 
of the process of mediation, and it is an alternative to the hostile battle of the “for” vs. the 
“against” camps (Hunzer 1999, p. 9). I argue that this approach is less antagonistic than 
traditional method of argumentation because through this approach arguers rise above the 
antagonism of “my belief is better than yours,” to a different level where arguers come to 
an agreement. It is still argumentation, but at a higher level because there is a better 
understanding of the issue by all the participants involved. In traditional argument, when 
someone wins an argument, you assume that the other person will see the rationale 
behind why a certain belief won, but this is not the case. Many participants of the 
traditional argument do not agree on why a given argument should be the winning one 
and are left with a position as either a winner or a loser; no knowledge is gained. But with 
the mediation and negotiation approach, you start with acknowledgement and move to 
understanding and agreement. Competition embedded in traditional argument impedes 
any advancement on the issue because there is still animosity between the participants. 
The purpose of this approach is that participants in dialogue adopt some kind of 
negotiatory stance on knowledge. As a result this approach serves the aim of 
argumentation better than the traditional mode of arguing.  
The final alternative to traditional argument, as explained by Hunzer, is dialogic 
or deliberative argumentation which allows for many voices to coexist at once in a 
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dialogue. Participants are encouraged to explore multiple perspectives all at once and to 
voice their ideas without denying any conflict that can arise (Hunzer 1999, p. 7). The 
point of this approach is to view an issue from many perspectives.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
What all these approaches have in common is that they show that arguments may work 
differently and become a mutual undertaking for shared knowledge, rather than an 
adversarial activity of winning and losing. These three above mentioned approaches 
allow individuals to find their voices, to adopt non-adversarial stances and to foster a 
cooperative rather than a competitive atmosphere. And because women and those of 
ethnic and minority backgrounds tend to be silenced by the traditional form of 
argumentation, these approaches will be helpful in allowing women to better express 
themselves and argue their point. Further, these approaches also show that there is an 
alternative way of arguing other than the strict traditional structure of argumentation. 
What these approaches share in common is that they all work together towards making 
argument a cooperative effort of gaining knowledge and searching for truth. An argument 
may be a narrative, a dialogue, and a conversation between others who are willing to 
listen. This does not mean ignoring difference or disagreement that exists among our 
varied beliefs, but that we should view difference in opinion as something that helps to 
propel the dialogue forward productively and encourage us to explore others’ views. As 
such, I disagree with Govier that difference in belief needs to be understood as minimal 
adversariality, it need not be viewed as adversariality at all. While recognizing that 
arguments may take place in different forms and ways indeed enriches our understanding 
of argument, it is also inclusive in that it allows for more types of argumentation, and 
ultimately gives voice to those who are silenced by the traditional conceptions of 
arguments.  
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: I am greatly indebted to Professor Catherine Hundleby and 
Hans Vilhelm Hansen for their extensive help and support.  
 
         Link to commentary 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Annas, J.P. (1996). Positioning oneself: A feminist approach to argument. In:  B. Emmel, P. Resch and D. 
Tenney (Eds.), Argument Revisited; Argument Redefined: Negotiating meaning in the composition 
classroom (pp. 127-152), Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Cebik, L.B. (1971). Narratives and arguments. Clio: A Journal of Literature, History, and the Philosophy of  
History 52(1), 7-24. 
Fulkerson, R. (1996). Transcending our conception of argument in light of feminist critiques. 
Argumentation & Advocacy 32(4), 199-306. 
Gilbert, M.A. (1997). Coalescent Argumentation. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Hunzer, K. M. (1999, March 24). Increasing the visibility of the disinclined and the silenced: Enabling 
alternatives of traditional argument. Education Resources Information Center. Annual meeting of 
the conference on college composition and communication Conf, 3-12.  
Moulton, J. (1983). A paradigm of philosophy: The adversary method. In: S. Harding and M. B. Hintikka. 
(Eds.), Discovering Reality: Feminist perspectives on epistemology, metaphysics, methodology, 
and philosophy of science (pp. 149-164). Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing Company. 
 
 
7
KHAMEIEL AL-TAMIMI 
 
 
 
8
Rooney, P. (2003). Feminism and argumentation: A response to Govier. Ontario Society for the Studies of 
Argumentation. Commentary: T. Goodnight. 
